

0050

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT OF  
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN  
OF REQUIREMENTS FOR PRODUCTION OF  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE FAR EAST  
(REVISED 15 JUNE 1950)

~~SECRET~~

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## THE PLAN

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction.....	1
Geographical Scope.....	4
Basis for sub-regional Groupings.....	4

## Appendix A (in two parts)

### PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL IN THE FAR EAST

Introduction to Appendix A.....	7
Appendix A-1, Vulnerability of areas in the Far East to Control Unfriendly to the United States (Introduction).....	9
1. China and Korea.....	12
2. The "Offshore Island Chain".....	12
a. Japan.....	12
b. The Ryukyus.....	13
c. The Philippines.....	14
3. Burma, Thailand and Indochina.....	15
4. Malaya and the East Indies (east to 127° E).....	15
5. Southwest Pacific: Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific south of the equator and east of 127° E to the Interna- tional Date Line.....	16
6. Western Pacific north of the equator.....	16
7. South Asia: India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Afghanistan.....	16
Appendix A-2: Capabilities for exercising and denying control of the Far East (Introduction).....	18
Group I: Prospects for USSR control of all or part of the Far Eastern region, and implications thereof:	
Area A: Areas oriented toward the USSR: China and northern Korea.....	21
Area B: Areas oriented toward the US: Southern Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghani- stan, Australia, and New Zealand.....	22
Area C: Areas of mixed orientation: Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Indochina.....	24
Group II: Prospects of Chinese Communist control of China and non-Soviet areas of Asia as an independent force.....	26
Group III: Prospects for continuation or growth of instability in non-Communist areas, and implications thereof.....	29
Group IV: Prospects for creating the will and ability for individual and coordinated opposition to Communism by Far Eastern areas:.....	
Area A : Areas oriented toward the USSR.....	31

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Area B: Areas oriented toward the US.....	32
Area C: Areas of mixed orientation.....	32
Special Fields:	
Regionalism.....	34
Pan-Asianism.....	35
Moslem Alliances.....	35

Appendix B

ECONOMIC POTENTIALITIES OF THE FAR EAST

Introduction to Appendix B.....	36
Area A: Area of present Soviet domination or influence...	38
Area B: Northeast Asia complex.....	40
Area C: Presently neutral or friendly areas.....	43
Area D: Areas under existing or possible Soviet domination.....	45
Special Regional Estimate: Far East strategic materials investigations.....	46

Map

Country groupings of Far Eastern areas.....	Following 7
---	-------------

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## INTRODUCTION

This plan represents an initial statement of requirements for production of National Intelligence concerning the Far East. It aims to define general fields of investigation, as distinct from specific projects. Employment of a plan of this sort will assist CIA in performing its assigned responsibilities for coordinating inter-departmental intelligence planning for accomplishment of the National Intelligence mission. As US intelligence producing agencies participate in the discussion, modification, and use of this plan, production of increasingly substantial and definitive National Intelligence on the Far East will be facilitated. It should be emphasized, however, that this plan indicates only the general course of required production; the precise course will be charted as detailed production programs and schedules are developed.

The plan will not eliminate all unanticipated production of National Intelligence concerning the Far East. Progress in its implementation, however, should reduce the need for such production. Moreover, with a comprehensive production plan at hand, ad hoc requirements can be placed in their proper perspective as to significance and priority. Without such a comprehensive plan, no rational system of priorities is possible.

In the development of this plan it was recognized that the main source of international tension is the USSR's drive toward world domination and the determination on the part of the US to oppose that drive. This plan, therefore, remains valid only so long as the US-USSR tension continues to be a dominant consideration in US national security.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

The form, timing and magnitude of Soviet threats to US security will tend to vary according to Soviet estimates of the effectiveness of measures employed in its elastic but relentless pursuit of world domination. Under such circumstances, this plan recognizes that the danger of armed conflict between the US and the USSR continues to mount, and that as a result, intelligence must concern itself particularly with problems relative to the likelihood and conduct of war.

Nevertheless, this plan does not overlook either the possibility or implications a continued "cold war," wherein either side may progressively acquire and employ such a preponderance of the elements of global power as to nullify the other's will and ability to wage a war of survival.

Determination of the scope of this plan has not been restrained by existing limitations on capabilities of US intelligence producing agencies, nor by present availability of source material. It is not intended to provide a plan that could be programmed and scheduled for complete production within any brief period of time. The intention is to provide all intelligence agencies with long term guidance for programming and scheduling intelligence production within their authority and competence, and for developing collection requirements directed towards identified intelligence needs.

This plan is designed to bring forth a systematic assessment of the degree to which developments in the Far East will or may affect US national security. Related thereto and identifiable are the facts that: 1) the Far East is a region of large material and human resources, 2) organization, control and efficient exploitation of these resources for the purposes of war could result in

SECRET

PAGES \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

Box \_\_\_\_\_

Folder # \_\_\_\_\_

Fon # \_\_\_\_\_

***BEST COPY***

***AVAILABLE***

SECRET

the creation of a relatively self-sufficient Far Eastern war-making complex, 3) such exploitation by a power or powers unfriendly to the US could impair US security, 4) in combination with a Eurasian war-making complex, a developed Far East could pose a crucial threat to US security, albeit this is a long-range and presently remote potential, 5) powers presently unfriendly to the US now are developing and exploiting areas of the region in a manner that does impair and could threaten US security.

In order to estimate the significance of the Far East and of developments there to US security interests, this plan provides guidance for:

a. Assessing possibilities for control in the Far East, to include:

- (1) Vulnerability of the Far East, area by area, to control by groups or powers unfavorably disposed to the US. (Appendix A-1)
- (2) Capabilities of each major party to the US-USSR struggle for acquiring for itself and/or for denying to the other the advantages that the areas of the region offer in attaining the respective objectives of the US and the USSR. (Appendix A-2)

b. Assessing Far Eastern potentialities for achieving significant economic development, and the implications thereof for war and peace (Appendix B), including investigation of the progress towards development of a comprehensive, self-sufficient war-making complex in the Far East in support of other centers of Soviet power.

The broad intelligence problems are broken down into major fields of investigation in the Appendices, as indicated. Examination should cover political, military, economic and other forces in the region as a whole, and its

SECRET

SECRET

sub-regional segments, in order to identify the significance of these areas and of developments within them as they appear in a regional perspective. From the major fields of investigation, specific projects will be developed in the programming stage and assigned for production in the scheduling stage. Specific National Intelligence Estimates may well involve prior production of basic intelligence studies. (See Appendix B in particular).

GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE

In general, the Far East is considered for the purpose of this plan to include the areas between 60° East and the International Date Line (excluding those portions of the USSR lying west of 100° East). This scope permits consideration of the economic potential of eastern Siberia and the industrial and military potential of South Asia, insofar as these are essential to strategic evaluation of the Far East region. Including eastern Siberia obviously does not preclude its consideration in estimates concerned primarily with the rest of the USSR; nor does the inclusion of South Asia exclude relevant considerations of this area with the Middle East. In turn, concern for conditions and developments centering in the Middle East or the USSR may require attention to pertinent factors in the Far East.

BASIS FOR SUB-REGIONAL GROUPINGS

The countries of the Far East have been arranged in various sub-regional groupings. These groupings are determined by the vulnerability of the individual areas (see Appendix A-1), their political orientation (see Appendix A-2) and the potentials for economic integration (see Appendix B).

Appendix A-1 essentially provides for assessment of the vulnerability of the Far East to control which is or may be unfriendly to the US. This



SECRET

assessment is based on tentative strategic groupings of countries and areas within the region. Thus, for example, the island arc comprising Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan and the Philippines is regarded as a logical strategic group suitable for such study.

Appendix A-2 primarily provides for internal and external political intelligence estimates. The common denominator in this field of investigation is political orientation. From this point of view, Japan and the Philippines are grouped with Thailand, a country of US orientation, rather than with Taiwan (as in Appendix A-1).

In Appendix B, areas are grouped according to a preliminary estimate of their actual or potential economic interrelations and according to assumptions or conclusions regarding vulnerability of certain countries (Appendix A-1) and regarding the prospects of control in particular countries as indicated by their political orientation (Appendix A-2). Thus, for example, one area grouping in Appendix B examines actual and potential economic integration of the Soviet Far East with China (including Manchuria) and northern Korea. From this point of view, by way of further illustration, Japan is examined with Manchuria, eastern Siberia, etc., rather than with Thailand and the Philippines, as in Appendix A-2, or with the Philippines without Thailand, as in Appendix A-1.

Analysis of the pertinent problems involving US security interests in each country of the Far East also requires examination of these problems in a regional context. It is believed that the groupings described above will, in the final analysis, permit that sort of integrated assessment of the region

SECRET

SECRET

as a whole, and the countries within the region, which is necessary to a proper evaluation of the interests and problems affecting US national security in the Far East.

SECRET

- 6 -

SECRET

DRAFT

APPENDIX A

(in two parts)

PROSPECTS FOR INFLUENCE OR CONTROL OF THE FAR EAST

INTRODUCTION

Much of the Far East's significance to US national security rests in the degree to which the major components of the region comprise a self-contained war potential, and in the degree to which these components may be brought under control of a power unfriendly to the US. Should such control permit development and exploitation of this war potential, the consequence could be critical and decisive in any armed conflict involving the US.




Another important aspect of the Far East's significance rests in the degree to which the systematic exploitation of the Far East in the furtherance of political, psychological, and economic warfare might eventually assist the controlling power to achieve world domination without resort to armed conflict.

The USSR now is believed to be employing all available pressures (including the strategic deployment of Soviet forces and use in combat of indigenous armed forces) to gain control of the whole Far East. Because of the existence of the Soviet objective of world domination and because of the significance that would attend Soviet success in the Far East, it becomes essential both to determine the prospects for friendly influence and unfriendly control of the Far East and to identify means whereby prospects for USSR control can be decreased and established USSR control can be diminished.

It is proposed to estimate the prospects for control of the Far East, either friendly to the United States or favoring the USSR, by two general approaches to the problem: (a) an area-by-area examination of vulnerabilities

SECRET

1146  
SECRET  
(Revision, 20 June 1950)



SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

to Soviet influence or control (covering political, economic, sociological, psychological and military considerations) with particular regard for interdependence of the sub-regional areas in resisting such control; and (b) a regional examination of the forces of control (friendly and unfriendly to the United States) that exist, or may arise within the region. The assessment of vulnerabilities under (a) should suggest both feasible positive measures for reducing the vulnerabilities identified, and for exploiting factors of strength or invulnerability.

This concerted application of a dual approach to the subsequent determination of prospects for control (i.e., vulnerabilities and the capabilities for exploiting vulnerabilities) frequently involves concern for identical factors in both approaches. The methods of employing these factors in developing assessments, however, vary with the type of approach. Both approaches take cognizance of the fact of incompatible differences in objectives and methods of the USSR and the US that tend to limit measures and counter-measures available to the latter.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX A-1

VULNERABILITY OF AREAS IN THE FAR EAST TO CONTROL UNFRIENDLY TO THE US

The concept of "unfriendly control" herein is a foreign or indigenous control that favors the USSR. Actual Soviet control might vary in nature and in degree from effective indirect influence to military occupation or outright incorporation. In whatever degree the control of an area were unfriendly to the US, it is apparent that the USSR would endeavor to exploit such control for its own purposes.

In extending its control or influence, the USSR is employing the following general types of measures, separately and in combination:

(1) Political, sociological, and psychological.

Exploitation and perversion of nationalistic ambitions and of internal frictions growing out of legitimate or fabricated and induced economic and political grievances.

(2) Economic.

Penetration, pressure and control.

(3) Armed force.

Strategic deployment and threatened use of Soviet armed forces, and employment or threatened use of military or unconventional forces by indigenous Communist troops and personnel.

In a period not involving hostilities between the US and the USSR, expected emphasis would be on (1) and (2), above, but not to the exclusion of (3). Under conditions of general hostilities involving forces of the

SECRET

SECRET

US and USSR, the emphasis would be on employment of Soviet and indigenous armed forces, supplemented by (1) and (2). It must be recognized, however, that, in effect, even now the USSR is employing armed forces to obtain its objectives, even though the preponderance of such forces is non-Russian indigenous forces, occasionally given inducement or moral support by the threat or encouragement resulting from the proximity of Soviet armed forces.

The Far East is broken down for purposes of this series of studies into seven strategic areas: (see Map One)

- Area A - China (including Manchuria but excluding Taiwan) and Korea. (The areas of Communist control in Asia plus the non-Communist toe-holds of southern Korea, Hong Kong and non-Communist China.)
- Area B - Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Philippines. (The offshore island chain which controls Asiatic access to the Pacific and flanks the coastal routes between Northeast and Southeast Asia.)
- Area C - Indochina, Thailand and Burma. (The principal normal food surplus area of the region and a buffer zone bordering Communist areas of Asia on the south.)
- Area D - Malaya and the East Indies, west of 127° East. (The principal Far Eastern source of strategic materials required by the US.)
- Area E - Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific Ocean. (A non-Communist area of secondary strategic significance on the Far Eastern periphery, of potential value as a non-Communist military base.)
- Area F - Pacific Ocean areas between 127° East and the International Date Line, north of the Equator but excluding the Aleutian Islands. (A second zone of US defense in the Pacific.)
- Area G - South Asia. (The non-Communist areas of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Afghanistan containing routes of access between the USSR and Southeast Asia, and existing and potential strategic bases.)

SECRET

**SECRET**

For assessment of the vulnerability of each strategic area, one or several general intelligence investigations may be involved according to the complexity of the subject and depending on the availability of timely studies. The following list of general fields of investigations is only tentative and will require more detailed analysis as production programs are developed.

**SECRET**



SECRET

## FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Vulnerability of China and Korea to extension and consolidation of Communist control.

Assessment of the Soviet and non-Soviet Communist capabilities for extending and consolidating Communist control in the sub-regional mainland area of China and Korea in relation to non-Communist vulnerabilities, taking into account the political, economic, sociological, psychological and military strengths and weaknesses of opposing groups. A summation of subsidiary country assessments available or in process of production.

2. Vulnerability of the "Offshore Island Chain" to expansion of Soviet influence or control.

Assessments of the vulnerability of this strategic area to Soviet measures of control short of war and, alternatively, in a war situation, should be made under varying assumed conditions of US and Soviet influence or control in adjacent areas listed below, and would be based on similar assessments of the individual components of the island chain. Alternative assumptions under which assessments should be made are:

a. Continuation of the cold war under the following conditions:

- (1) Status quo continues in all adjoining areas except for effective consolidation of Communist control in China.
- (2) Southern Korea comes under Communist domination and strong Soviet influence; all of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan come under CCP control. Strong Communist trend in SEA and steady weakening of Western powers' position in that area.

b. An active war under conditions a(1) and (2), above.

Vulnerability of Japan to expansion of Soviet influence or control

Assessment of the vulnerability of Japan to all Communist measures of penetration should be made under each of the following assumed conditions:

SECRET

SECRET

- a. In a continuation of the present "cold war" situation: China and northern Korea under control of Communist regimes; and southern Korea maintaining its integrity; US support in Japan, including occupation forces, maintained at present levels. (Include consideration of the effectiveness of the peace treaty controversy as a means of Soviet penetration.)
- b. In a projection of the "cold war": China, including Taiwan, under firm CCP control with CCP expansion into SEA evident; southern Korea under Communist control; a Japan peace treaty in effect. (Consider the economic pressures available as a means of Soviet penetration; also the impact on Japan's vulnerability of the Soviet-held PW's or Soviet indoctrinated repatriates.)
- c. In war between the US and USSR:
  - (1) No major change in present general Soviet troop dispositions; Japan and the Ryukyus under continued US occupation at approximately present strengths. Taiwan not under CCP control.
  - (2) Soviet military bases established in southern Korea, along the China coast and in Taiwan; Japan and the Ryukyus under continued US occupation at approximately present strengths up to declaration of war; total Soviet forces in the Far East not augmented.

Note: Under each of the above alternatives of a war situation, consideration should be given to the comparative vulnerability of Japan under conditions of a simultaneous outbreak of US-USSR hostilities on all fronts and a deferred Soviet Far Eastern offensive following a declaration of war; to the effect of Soviet military control over the Aleutians and Alaskan bases by D-Day + 30; and to Soviet capabilities for establishing influence in Japan by use of indoctrinated repatriates. (An estimate of the Soviet logistical position in the Far East will be an important factor in assessing vulnerability of the region to Soviet expansion in time of war.)

Vulnerability of the Ryukyus to expansion of Soviet influence or control

Assessment should be made of Soviet prospects for penetrating this US-occupied area (a) before and (b) after an assumed outbreak of general hostilities with regard for all available Soviet measures of penetration under each of the following assumed conditions:

SECRET

SECRET

- a. Status quo continues in adjoining areas up to the outbreak of hostilities.
- b. Same as a above, except that Taiwan will have come under CCP control by the end of 1950.
- c. Japanese peace treaty signed with Japan a free agent, southern Korea under Communist control with active Soviet base development under way there, free Soviet access to the China coast and Taiwan prior to hostilities, and the Philippines still under non-Communist control with US interests there largely unaffected by internal developments.
- d. Same as c, above, with Japan aligned with the USSR prior to US-USSR hostilities.

Vulnerability of the Philippines to Soviet expansion

Assessment of vulnerabilities to direct and indirect Soviet penetration both prior to and after an assumed outbreak of US-USSR hostilities. Each of the following assumed situations should be covered specifically:

- a. Independence of southern Korea maintained, Japan and the Ryukyus still under US occupation, Taiwan under non-Communist Chinese control, and Hong Kong still under effective British control up to the outbreak of hostilities; and
- b. Southern Korea and Japan under Communist domination and aligned with the USSR; China, Hong Kong and Taiwan under firm CCP control, with free Soviet military and economic access thereto. In addition, the assessment should consider the effect on the conclusions in situation b of:
  - (1) Ascendancy on Soviet influence in
    - i. Burma, Thailand, Indochina
    - ii. Indonesia, and Malaya as well, and
  - (2) US withdrawal from the Ryukyus.

SECRET

-14-

SECRET

3. Vulnerability of Burma, Thailand, and Indochina to Soviet expansion

Assessment of vulnerabilities of this sub-regional food surplus area to all measures of Soviet penetration both in an extension of the cold war and in a period of general, active hostilities involving the US and USSR under each of the following assumed situations existing prior to or at the outbreak of such hostilities:

- a. China under CCP consolidated control; status quo maintained in Hong Kong, southern Korea and the offshore island chain; established authority in Burma and Indochina remains in tenuous control.
- b. Same as a, above, except that southern Korea comes under Communist domination, CCP control extends over Hong Kong and Taiwan, US occupation forces are withdrawn from Japan pursuant to a peace treaty by the end of 1950, but the present degree of US influence in the Ryukyus and the Philippines is maintained.
- c. All US influence in China and Korea and the offshore island chain is eliminated.

Note: The need for separate country studies would depend on assessment of available material.

4. Vulnerability of Malaya and the East Indies (east to 127°E) to Soviet expansion

Assessment of vulnerabilities to all measures of Soviet penetration under each set of assumed conditions listed below with particular regard for the effect on US accessibility to the essential materials of the region. Alternative assumptions under which assessment should be made are:

- a. In a continued "cold war" with present US control maintained in the offshore island chain, China under consolidated CCP control, growing instability or growing Communist influence in Burma, Thailand, and Indochina, and continuation of the present situation in Malaya, Indonesia, and South Asia.
- b. Following an outbreak of US-USSR hostilities with all China under consolidated Communist control, the US eliminated from

SECRET

Japan, US bases maintained in the Ryukyus and the Philippines, increased instability or unfriendly control in Burma, Thailand and Indochina, and continuation of present situation in South Asia.

- c. Same as a and b above, except for significant increase of Soviet influence or control in South Asia.

5. Vulnerability of the Southwest Pacific to Soviet expansion

Assessment of vulnerabilities in time of US-USSR hostilities only, but including consideration of all measures of Soviet penetration with special regard for the status of lines of communication with the US and the UK. Specific areas covered would be Australia, New Zealand and the rest of the Pacific area south of the equator lying between 127° E and the International Date Line. Assessment should cover both the following assumed situations:

- a. Firm non-Communist control of the Asian offshore island chain and Southeast Asia.
- b. Soviet control of, or predominant influence in, all eastern Asia.

6. Vulnerability of the Western Pacific north of the equator

Assessment of vulnerabilities in time of US-USSR hostilities only, but including consideration of all measures of Soviet penetration. Specific areas covered should exclude the Asian offshore island chain and the Aleutian Islands. Assessment should cover each of the following assumed situations:

- a. Firm non-Communist control of the Asian offshore island chain and the Aleutians;
- b. Continued non-Communist control of the Asian offshore island chain but US control of the Aleutians eliminated; and
- c. Soviet control of both the Asian offshore island chain and the Aleutians.

7. Vulnerability of South Asia

Assessment of vulnerabilities to all measures of Soviet penetration both in a continuation of the present "cold war" and in a situation of open US-USSR hostilities under each of the following assumptions:

SECRET

SECRET

- a. Strong Soviet influence in eastern Asia not appreciably expanded beyond present limits.
- b. Strong Soviet influence or control established throughout China (including Taiwan), and in Indochina, Thailand and Burma.
- c. Western control and influence substantially eliminated from the mainland of eastern Asia and the major offshore islands including Indonesia.

-17-

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX

CAPABILITIES FOR EXERCISING AND DENYING CONTROL OF THE FAR EAST

Any of four general conditions affecting the US security position in Asia is possible under complete or partial control by a power or powers friendly or unfriendly to the US, depending on the degree of control and the political orientation of the controlling force --

- (1) Capability for independent, direct offensive threat to US national security, based on a self-sufficient war-making complex, consequent to complete control of the Far East by a power unfriendly to the US and its marshalling of the Far East's war potential. (It is estimated that only the USSR has a capability for realizing this potential and that this cannot be realized within any short period of time. Basis for estimate of the probability of Soviet realization of this potential is provided in Group I, below.)
- (2) Positive denial to the US of elements of major strategic interest without posing a capability for independent, offensive action against US national security, consequent to limited control by a power or powers unfriendly to the US. (Only the USSR and/or China is capable of creating this condition which is less critical than that under (1) above, and which is more likely of realization within the practical future. Basis for estimate of the degree of attainment of this condition is provided in Group II, below.)
- (3) Incidental denial to the US, and to both friendly and unfriendly powers, of elements of strategic advantage, consequent to conditions of instability or of neutrality. This condition presently exists

SECRET

- 16 -

SECRET

in considerable degree in the Far East. (Group III, below).

- (4) Positive availability to the US and denial to powers unfriendly to the US of elements of strategic advantage, consequent to maintenance of stability and development of the will and ability for individual and coordinated opposition to Communism in Far Eastern areas. Development of this condition is a preeminent US objective. (Group IV).

Determination of the potential for control and denial depends partly on political orientation of the areas. Because the strategy and problems of expanding Communism differ with the general political orientation of various countries, but are relatively similar in countries of similar orientation, the countries of the Far East are grouped in three political groupings for purposes of setting up these fields of investigation. These areas have been grouped according to estimate of political orientation on 8 December 1949 (see Map Two).

Area A Areas oriented towards the USSR: China and northern Korea.

Area B Areas oriented towards the US: all of the independent and commonwealth nations (except China and Burma).

Area C Areas of mixed orientation: The colonial areas and those of uncertain stability.

It is estimated that the USSR, possibly with the instrument of China, is the only power unfriendly to the US possessing any remote potential for bringing the war-potential of the Far East under single, centralized control. Consequently, intelligence production designed to determine "Capabilities for exercising and denying control in the Far East" can be focused on two principal

SECRET



SECRET

strategic considerations --

1. policies, objectives and capabilities of Communism (Soviet and indigenous).
2. Limitations restricting attainment of these objectives.

Proceeding with this approach, the following investigations should be conducted, leading to: (a) determination of the prospects for unfriendly and friendly control of the Far East as this control may produce any of the four conditions outlined above, and (b) identification of forces whereby prospects for unfriendly control can be decreased and prospects for incidental denial to the US of strategic advantages can be minimized.

SECRET

- 20 -

SECRET

GROUP I

PROSPECTS FOR USSR CONTROL OF ALL OR PART OF THE FAR EASTERN REGION, AND  
IMPLICATIONS THEREOF

AREA A - Areas oriented toward the USSR (China and northern Korea).

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Soviet policies, objectives and capabilities

a. Soviet objectives and policies in China

This area of investigation is directed at analyzing Soviet political, economic, and military aims, tactics and strategy in China, including consideration of methods and pressures employed, intent towards political, economic and military integration of the area with the Soviet Far East, strategy in employment of China as an instrument of Communist expansion throughout the Far East, and distinctions in Soviet intent in China proper and in the areas of Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang that separate China proper from the USSR.

b. Soviet objectives and policies in Korea

Analysis aimed at assessing the nature and degree of actual and probable political, economic, psychological and military pressures exerted by the USSR, and the effectiveness and significance of those pressures in achieving Soviet control of the northeast Asian complex as a self-contained, direct offensive threat on US national security. Concern should be given to the distinction between control that enhances Soviet ability to pose an offensive threat to the US and control that merely denies to the US access to strategic materials of the area.

c. Soviet capabilities for attaining effective control of (a) China Proper, (b) Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, and (c) Korea.

Analysis aimed at assessing the nature and degree of actual and probable political, economic, psychological and military pressures exerted by the USSR on these several areas, and the effectiveness and significance of those pressures in achieving Soviet control of the Northeast Asian complex as a self-contained direct offensive threat on US national security. Concern should be given to the distinction between control that enhances Soviet ability to pose an offensive threat to the US and control that merely denies to the US access to strategic materials of the area.

SECRET

- 21 -

SECRET

2. Limitations on Soviet expansion

a. Inherent limiting factors in Soviet expansion

This field will be explored by a variety of studies designed to identify and evaluate the force and effectiveness of factors that inherently impede both Soviet and native Communism's progress in gaining control and effective consolidation of China and Korea as parts of the northeast Asian complex. Particular concern should be given to - problems that confront the USSR in its endeavor to gain practical, though not apparent, subservience of Communist China; effect of economic inadequacies and dependence as elements denying or retarding Soviet development of political, economic and military integration of a self-sufficient Far Eastern complex; administrative and technical inadequacies; factionalism; forces of moderation (particularly political, sociological and psychological that may produce a moderating or obstructionist effect upon executive plans for Communization of the areas within the northeast Asia complex; and resistance movements and organizations (armed or otherwise).

b. Potentials of US strength for active opposition to Soviet measures of expansion

This field should aim to determine effectiveness of US exploitation of elements of strength with object of attaining neutralization of Soviet capabilities at least, and, at most, of obtaining active alignment with the US of forces of power in opposition to Communism in the northeast Asia complex. This field of investigation should be in two phases - (1) identification of factors (particularly political, economic and psychological that can be brought under US influence), and (2) assessment of effectiveness of exploiting these factors by various available means.

AREA B - Areas oriented toward the US (Southern Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Australia and New Zealand)

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Policies, objectives and capabilities of the USSR and native Communist movements in the independent and Commonwealth countries of the Far East (excluding Burma).

a. Soviet objectives and policies

This area of assessment should aim to identify objectives of Communism and methods employed in pursuit of those objectives. It would involve country-by-country assessments of political, economic, psychological and military methods employed by the USSR towards the end of destroying the existing western-inclination of governments of these areas.

SECRET

SECRET

Particular concern should be given to Soviet and Communist tactics and strategy as they (a) are directed at decreasing existing political and social stability, and (b) employ direct Soviet attacks, the force of indigenous Communist movements, and the instrument of other Far Eastern native Communist movements (particularly Chinese).

b. Soviet capabilities for reorienting and communizing the independent and Commonwealth areas of the Far East (except Burma).

Assessment of the degree to which these areas may be caused to incline to the USSR, involving country-by-country, and where appropriate, sub-regional assessments of Communist capabilities for exploiting elements producing USSR-inclination and of native capacity for counteracting their vulnerabilities by controls and/or reform. Emphasis should include political, economic, psychological and military vulnerability of these areas in their independent positions and in their relationships among other nations, and capabilities for eliminating the elements of vulnerability.

2. Limitations on Communist capabilities in these areas

a. Inherent limiting factors in Communist expansion

Identification and assessment of the force of factors limiting pursuit of Communist objectives, involving country-by-country studies, and several sub-regional studies (see below), designed to identify and evaluate the factors that impede effectiveness of Communist endeavors to reorient these areas to the USSR. These will deal with political, economic, social, religious, cultural, psychological, geographical and military (internal security) factors that limit effectiveness of Communist endeavors. Certain regional studies also should be done on Chinese participation in Far Eastern Communist movements as a limiting factor; and religion, particularly Islam and Catholicism, as limiting factors.

b. Potentials of US strength

Assessment of US capabilities for attaining friendly neutrality of these areas at least, and at most their active alignment with the US as a positive force in the Western conflict with Communism consequent to existence of the foregoing limiting factors.

These studies, country-by-country and, where appropriate, areawise, should (a) identify factors of strength limiting effectiveness of Communism within each country and areawise, (b) consider alternatives available to the US, to the area and to the countries for exploiting

SECRET

SECRET

the factors of strength and decreasing the factors of vulnerability, and (c) estimate effectiveness of various courses of coordinated action designed to strengthen the individual and collective will and ability in their opposition to Communism in concert with the West.

AREA C - Areas of mixed orientation (Burma and the colonial areas of actual or potential instability: Malaya, Indonesia and Indochina).

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Soviet policies, objectives and capabilities

a. Soviet objectives and policies

Identification of Soviet objectives, policies and methods, involving country and area studies emphasizing Soviet methods of enticing and increasing the USSR orientation of these indecisive areas, with particular concern for identifying Soviet methods of creating and exploiting vulnerabilities, and Soviet techniques of applying direct (by the USSR) and indirect (by instruments of the USSR, as Overseas Chinese) pressure. Differences in objectives, policies and methods as they apply to different areas also should be identified.

b. Communist capabilities for orienting to the USSR areas of mixed orientation.

Assessment of Communist capabilities for gaining control and USSR orientation of these areas, involving country-by-country, and where appropriate, sub-regional assessments of (a) vulnerability of these areas to Communist pressures, and (b) capabilities for counteracting their vulnerabilities. Emphasis should include political, economic, psychological and military (especially internal security), vulnerabilities in their independent positions and in their relationships among other nations, and capabilities for eliminating the elements of vulnerability.

2. Limitations on Communization of these areas, and US potential for strengthening the US-proclivity to a point of gaining their alignment with the US to permit availability of their resources at least, and of creating the will and ability for independent and collective active opposition to Communism, in concert with the West, at most.

a. Inherent limiting factors in Communist expansion

Identification and assessment of the force of factors limiting pursuit of Communist objectives, involving country-by-country studies,

SECRET

SECRET

and several sub-regional estimates, designed to identify and evaluate the factors that impede effectiveness of Communist endeavors to orient these areas to the USSR. These should deal with political, economic, social, religious, cultural, psychological, geographical and military (internal security) factors that limit effectiveness of Communist endeavors. Special concern should be given to the native characteristics and force of nationalism with particular concern for the nature of any association between nationalist movements and Communism and for factors that encourage or discourage that association. Sub-regional studies should include assessment of cultural homogeneity and Islam as limiting factors, and of the inter-dependence of these areas among themselves and with other Far Eastern areas.

b. Potentials of US strength

Assessment of effectiveness of various courses of action available to the US in the light of the foregoing limiting factors and other potentials aimed at strengthening the alignment of these areas with the US and of developing within them the will and ability for independent and collective opposition, in concert with the West, to Communism within their areas and the Far East. These studies, country-by-country and areawise, should (a) identify factors of strength limiting effectiveness of Communism within each country and areawise, (b) consider alternatives available to the US, to the area and to the countries for exploiting the factors of Communist vulnerability, and (c) estimate effectiveness of various courses of coordinated action designed to strengthen the individual and collective will and ability in their opposition to Communism in concert with the West. Particular concern should be given to means available for exploiting nationalistic ambitions of these areas as a means of creating the will to oppose Communism, and the requirements for creating within them the ability effectively to oppose Communization within their areas and the Far East.

- 25 -

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP II

PROSPECTS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL OF CHINA AND NON-SOVIET AREAS OF ASIA AS AN INDEPENDENT FORCE IN THE FAR EAST AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Policies, objectives and capabilities of Chinese Communism

a. Chinese Communist objectives and policies in China

Identification of Chinese Communist objectives and policies for control of China, including the basic demographic, economic, military and political considerations which determine the problems of China under any government; the theory of the "New Democracy"; the transition stage of the Chinese revolution; and the CCP's great contribution to the theory and practice of international Communism. Concern should include consideration of China's intent in relations with the USSR, and of evidence of China's subservience to or independence of the USSR, and of China's policies towards Western nations.

b. Chinese Communist objectives and policies in Asia.

Investigations of the intent and methods of the Chinese Communists in Asia with particular concern for their pursuance of their announced objective to aid in the Communization of Asia. Chinese methods, particularly as they employ overseas Chinese residents and manipulate native movements, should be identified. Special concern should be given to China's intent to control these governments either as an instrument of, or as independent of the USSR.

c. Capabilities of the Chinese Communist government to gain and maintain effective control of China.

Studies of ability of the Chinese Communist government to gain and maintain popular support, to bring under its control the essential political, economic and military (including international security) forces, and to exploit these to a degree that, with possible accompanying Chinese effectiveness elsewhere in Asia, will create positive denial to the US of elements of strategic interest without posing a capability for independent, offensive action against US national security. Concern should include capability for independent, offensive action against US national security; also capability of the Chinese to pursue their interests (as identified in "a" above) in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, as well as the other border areas of Tibet, the northwest and Taiwan, with special concern for any conflict of interest that may exist between China and the USSR in these areas.

SECRET

SECRET

d. Capabilities for the Communist government of China to aid development of Communist regions in Asia.

A group of studies directed at estimating effectiveness of Chinese methods ("b", above) in creating capability for bringing Communist regions into control of other Far Eastern areas. Special concern should be given to identify and appraisal of resources available to the Chinese, and to vulnerabilities within the areas to Chinese exploitation of these resources.

2. Limitations on Chinese Communist control of China and on China's capability for aiding in creation of Communist regimes elsewhere in Asia.

a. Limiting factors in Chinese Communist consolidation of authority, control and communization of China.

Assessment of the effectiveness of limiting factors in the Communization of China. Particularly to be considered are the nature, extent and effect of China's economic inadequacies and dependence; administrative and technical inadequacies; factionalism; government foreign policy, particularly vis-a-vis the USSR, as this may create a limiting factor; resistance from forces of moderation and traditional basis for regimentation; obstruction from neighboring areas that may restrict China's success to sources of support (esp. financially) upon which China habitually has depended.

b. Limiting factors in capability of Chinese Communists for bringing about Communist regimes in other Far Eastern areas.

Country-by-country and area estimates of the forces in Asia that tend to or do impede Chinese endeavors to promote establishment of Communist regimes throughout Asia. Particular concern will be for political, economic, social, religious, cultural, psychological, and geographic factors. Estimate of the force of overseas Chinese should be included, and also consideration of the general antipathy for Chinese as a vital limiting factor.

c. Potentials for US exploitation of weaknesses.

Studies, based on identification of factors limiting Chinese capabilities (potential US strengths) and factors favoring Chinese capabilities (local vulnerabilities), directed at setting up various courses of action available for exploiting local strengths and eliminating vulnerabilities and assessing effectiveness of these various courses of action designed to produce the will and ability for independent and collective action by these areas, in concert with the West, for preventing development of Communism in their areas. Concern should be directed primarily at eliminating weaknesses and

SECRET



SECRET

exploiting strengths, and at creating the will and ability for native action. This will require consideration of nationalistic ambitions, economic requirements, anti-Chinese sentiment in southeast Asia, internal security capabilities, agricultural dislocations, etc. Forces of concern should be primarily political, economic and psychological. Various forms for application of military force also should be considered.

SECRET

- 28 -

SECRET

GROUP III

PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUATION OR GROWTH OF INSTABILITY IN NON-COMMUNIST AREAS,  
AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF.

(Policies and objectives supporting capabilities to be investigated and estimated within this group are the same for the USSR and China as those covered by Groups I and II. Therefore, additional concern for policies and objectives required by Group III is confined to Western powers with interests in the Far East.)

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Policies, objectives and capabilities of the Western Powers in areas of the Far East.

Estimates of the nature, effectiveness, capabilities, and possible consequences of the policies and activities of the Western Powers in the Far East.

2. Prospects for continuation or development of instability in non-Communist areas and implications thereof.

Analysis of the existing causes, significance, origin and nature, and prospects for development of instability under conditions of:

Soviet instigation  
Chinese Communist instigation  
Local native Communist instigation  
Indigenous political, economic and military inadequacies.

Particular concern should be devoted to methods available for neutralizing the elements of instability, whether by counter-acting Communist instigation, by reforming internal factors

SECRET

SECRET

producing instability, by application of external assistance, or by adjustments in international relations. Elements of instability to be considered should include political (internal and international), economic (internal and international, e.g., dependence on international trade and/or foreign economic aid), administrative and technical, military (both internal and external factors), psychological and social.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP IV

PROSPECTS FOR CREATING THE WILL AND ABILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL AND COORDINATED  
OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM BY FAR EASTERN AREAS.

(In the following it is assumed that presently - in Area A there exists neither the general will nor ability to oppose Communism; in Area B there exists the general will and a partial, though uncertain, ability; in Area C there exists an uncertain and unstable will subject to vacillation and manipulation, and a generally non-existent, though possibly, potential ability dependent on internal adjustments, external assistance, and intra-regional adjustments and coordination. Considerations of policies are adequately provided in Groups I, II and III above.)

Area A - Areas oriented toward the USSR (China and northern Korea)

FIELD OF INVESTIGATION

Prospects for developing within this area latent elements of potential resistance, and of nourishing development of new elements.

A group of investigations designed (a) to identify and assess intellectual, cultural, psychological, religious and other sources of potential resistance to the Communization of China and northern Korea, (b) to determine methods available to the West for exploiting resistance to Communization of China and Korea, and the Communists independence on outside relations, and (c) to assess the efficacy of various courses of action, both in and outside the Area, for decreasing the effective control of the Communist regimes and increasing internal opposition to the Communist rule and Communization of these areas.

SECRET

- 31 -

SECRET

Area B - Areas oriented toward the US (Southern Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Australia, and New Zealand).

FIELD OF INVESTIGATION

Prospects for strengthening the US-proclivity of US-inclined areas and of increasing their ability to maintain their independence of, and to contribute to opposition of Communism in Asia.

A group of country-by-country, and sub-regional studies directed at (a) determining capabilities in terms of strengths and weaknesses in administration; political conditions; economic factors and forces; geographical location; racial, religious and population factors; internal security capabilities and external military potential; and sociological, cultural and psychological factors, (b) identifying requirements for strengthening these capabilities (as these requirements may dictate internal country action, regional action and coordination, and US participation), and (c) assessing the value of various courses of action designed to strengthen the will and increase the ability for controlling and opposing Communism.

Area C - Areas of mixed orientation (Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and Indochina)

FIELD OF INVESTIGATION

Prospects for creating the will and ability for individual and coordinated opposition to Communism in areas of mixed orientation and uncertain instability.

Investigations of these areas will be based on assumption that "the native population of Indochina, Indonesia and Malaya, will be nationalistic, will prefer neutrality, and will determine their orientation according to apparent national self-interest. Inability of these colonial populations to achieve their aspirations for national identity through relations with the respective governments of France, the Netherlands, and the UK can result in their inclining to USSR-orientation." (ORE 17-49, p. 7) Assuming that genuine endeavors to satisfy nationalistic ambitions of these peoples is prerequisite to creation of the will to resist Communism, these investigations will be concerned with the effect of various possible treatments of nationalism, and with the nature, extent and deficiencies in capabilities that are and may be consequent to probable developments

SECRET

SECRET

in these areas, including the need for supporting the colonial powers in Europe and their colonial peoples in Asia. Particular concern should be devoted to estimates of requirements for creation of a capability whereby these areas could themselves exert internal control and external opposition to the Communization of Asia.

SECRET

SECRET

SPECIAL FIELDS

A. Special Regional Estimates - REGIONALISM

Far Eastern regionalism may develop either in opposition to or in support of Communist expansion. These possibilities should be examined in the following terms:

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Potentialities for Pacific area anti-Communist or non-Communist joint action.

This investigation should initially assess the differences encountered in working out a Pacific Security Group as contrasted with the Atlantic Pact, considering the lack of homogeneity of population, lack of mature long-established democratic government, political heritage, economic integration, lack of geographical contiguity, and rivalry for leadership.

The investigation would then consider the centripetal forces, such as anti-Communism, historical and cultural ties, and common security interests.

Development of Pacific security groupings should be considered under three forms:

(a) self-initiated and Asiatic-led anti-or non-Communist, or neutral regionalism, independent of western power support, and either adopting a neutral or positively anti-Communist stand; (b) the latent and actual susceptibility of non-Communist Asia and the Pacific Area to a US-induced security group with support from the UK. (The relationship of the metropolitan powers and the "former" colonial areas should be explored. Point IV and other possible US inducements would be indicated); and (c) as a substitute for a joint security grouping, the possibility of security developments on a semi-bilateral basis between the US or UK and various Asiatic/Pacific non-Communist governments with the long-run respect of one grouping brought about under the pressure of common security.

2. Communist regionalism under China's leadership.

This investigation should explore the actual advance towards formation of Communist regionalism as well as Chinese ambitions and intentions. The Chinese Communists may be expected to attempt integration - politically, economically and militarily - of those areas having Communist or Communist-dominated governments such as the Democratic People's Republic of (northern) Korea. The Chinese will exploit for purposes of communization and integration all the propaganda value in "colonialism" in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya and to a lesser extent in Burma. The same "line" may be adopted in regard to the Republic of (southern) Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. "Feudalism" may be exploited to expand influence in

SECRET

SECRET

the Philippines and possibly Thailand. Chinese Communists will have certain economic weapons which may be exploited to assist local native parties as in Japan. Assess the potentialities of exploitation offered by Chinese colonies throughout Asia.

The full picture cannot be fully depicted without consideration of USSR reaction to the expansion of Chinese influence and without stating the stages of deterioration of US prestige and strategic influence as Communist regionalism progresses.

It may seem necessary to consider the degree of opposition, either of purely native origin or inspired by hopes or assurances of UK or US support, that the Chinese may expect to meet in individual countries.

B. Secondary Interest Projects

1. Possibility of Pan-Asianism

The ultimate development of Pan-Asianism under strictly Asiatic sponsorship, despite broad centripetal forces, cannot be anticipated for so long as the forces of Communism and anti-Communism are principal contenders for support in Asia. This investigation should be one of continuing interest although of low priority.

2. Moslem-influenced anti-Communist alliance in Asia and Middle East.

Estimate of the potential and force of the Moslem world as a force of opposition to Communism.

SECRET

- 35 -



POTENTIALITIES OF THE FAR EAST

The potentialities of any given area or region may be assessed in terms of the extent to which (a) the area needs physical and human resources, is self-sufficient in resources, or has excess resources; (b) the area needs military support, can support itself, or can also give support to others. Intelligence production concerning the Far East as a whole, as well as particular areas within the Far East, is planned with respect to these two major considerations. This assessment should show to what extent surplus resources in any one area may be available for supplying resource needs in other areas, and even, in a qualified manner, how far a war potential in any area may be available for supporting another area. Special interest is attached to the degree to which, concretely, the Far East as a whole, as well as each particular area within the Far East, is able to meet its peacetime requirements and is capable of taking part in war in economic independence from, but in support of either the USSR or the US in the event of conflict between these major powers.

In these investigations, four key area groupings have been made:

(See Map Three):

- Area A: China proper, Manchuria, northern Korea and the Soviet Far East. Elements of this large sub-regional area of East Asia have in common the fact that they now are under either the domination or the direct influence of the USSR. Subsidiary areas of investigation in this series will attempt to determine the economic integration and potential of those "Curtain" countries.
- Area B: The area designated as "Area A," plus Japan, southern Korea, and Taiwan. Elements in this sub-regional area constitute the natural complex of northeast Asia. This series will examine the consequences of any or all these countries coming under the influence or domination of the USSR. Individual analyses in this series will examine, among other factors, the strategic implications of shifts in US policy with respect to such countries as Japan.

SECRET

SECRET

**Area C:** Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Indian sub-continent. Elements in this sub-regional grouping are at least neutral toward the US at the present time, if not friendly to it. On the assumption that Japan will continue in virtual economic isolation from East Asia, investigations will be made (a) to determine the extent to which the potentialities for excess resources in one or more of the countries in these areas might be made available for meeting the needs in the other countries, and to which, in this sense, the three areas together might be mutually self-supporting; and hence (b) to assess the strategic value of this combination of countries to the US in the event of war.

**Area D:** The USSR-dominated area of Asia ("Area A") plus certain countries of Southeast Asia selected on the basis of "vulnerability" studies (See Appendix A-1). Individual studies will attempt to determine the net strategic gain to the USSR of selected areas of Southeast Asia and the net loss to the US.

A special regional examination of the extent to which the USSR and the US are dependent on the Far East for strategic materials also is required.

Based on the foregoing four sub-regional area groupings and one regional field of investigation, five general fields of investigation are established. The general breakdown of investigation of these five fields is set forth hereafter.

SECRET

- 37 -

SECRET

AREA A

AREA OF PRESENT SOVIET DOMINATION OR INFLUENCE

Problem:

(1) To estimate the existing economic development and integration in the area comprised of China proper, Manchuria, northern Korea and the Soviet Far East, and the possibilities for further development and closer integration; and (2) to estimate the capability of this area to develop war-making potential, economically independent of European USSR and able to support the USSR in any general conflict embracing the Far East.

1. Power Capacity and Potential

Investigation of the power facilities, their adequacy for support of current economic activity, the existing area integration of the separate power systems and the possibility of expanding area capacity both by closer integration and by addition to facilities.

2. Fuel Availability and Requirements

To determine the present fuel production of the area and to assess the possibility of increasing production to meet the needs of a mobilized economy.

An analysis of current field requirements and additional requirements that would result from mobilization; an analysis of production and reserves, and of the condition and capacity of production installations and equipment; an assessment of the possibility of expanding output of fuels to support a mobilized economy; an analysis of the availability of substitute fuels.

3. The Strategic Materials Position

A survey of the supply of such strategic materials position of the area and the degree to which area supplies are adequate or can be expanded to meet the needs of a mobilized economy.

4. The Food Position

An analysis of production and consumption of basic foodstuffs and the extent to which surplus and deficit areas can be integrated for self-sufficiency in food.

5. Manpower Resources

Determination of the size of the population and the labor force, the distribution of workers by occupation and industry, the possibility of expanding the labor force by immigration or other

SECRET

SECRET

means, the maximum number of workers than can be employed in the military sector of the economy, and the availability of managerial and technical skills.

6. Existing Industrial Plant and Prospects for Industrial Development

An appraisal of the nature, condition and capacity of industrial plant; an assessment of the degree of expansion possible; an analysis of specific or general bottlenecks to present and future output or expansion.

7. Inland Transportation

A comprehensive survey of existing railroads, waterways and roads; seasonal factors affecting their capacity; mobile equipment and facilities for maintenance; the present degree of integration of the transportation network and its adequacy to support the present economy; an estimate of the possibility, through closer integration and further development, of the network's adequacy to support the peacetime economy and a war-making potential.

8. Coastwise and Ocean Shipping

An estimate of the dry cargo and tanker tonnage currently operating within and to the area; a description of the national control of this tonnage and an assessment of that part which would remain available in the event of war; an assessment of shipbuilding capacity of the area and of the availability to it of shipbuilding capacity elsewhere.

9. Existing and Possible Future Trade Patterns

An examination of the extent to which intra-area and foreign trade can eliminate weaknesses in the economy that may prevent maximum industrial output; a specific estimate of the degree to which expanded trade with European USSR may solve production problems and an estimate of the possibility of such an expansion taking place; similar estimates with regard to other areas of the Far East and the US and Western Europe.

10. Assessment of the Area's Capabilities for War Mobilization

An analysis of the existing and potential degree of economic integration through a consideration of integration of transportation and power networks, intra-area and foreign trade, industrial patterns, and level of industrial development. The study will identify weaknesses and bottlenecks which will or may limit this potential. An estimate (quantitative, if possible) of the present and future ability to mobilize a war economy which would be economically independent of European USSR and could support the USSR in any conflict embracing the Far East.


SECRET

AREA B

NORTHEAST ASIA COMPLEX

Problem: To determine the extent to which the economic alignment of Japan, southern Korea and Taiwan with the Soviet-dominated or Soviet-controlled area of Asia (China, Manchuria, northern Korea, and the Soviet Far East) would add to Northeast Asian self-sufficiency and to the war-making potential of this whole area.


25X6A



SECRET

SECRET

25X6A



5. The Effect of the Alignment of Southern Korea with Soviet-dominated Asia upon the War-making Potential of the Whole Area.

An analysis of the southern Korean economy and an assessment of the degree to which it could add to the peacetime economy and the war-making potential of Soviet-dominated Asia under the assumptions: [REDACTED]

25X6A

25X6A

6. The Effect of the Alignment of Taiwan with Soviet-dominated Asia on the War-making Potential of the Whole Area.

An analysis of the economy of Taiwan and an assessment of the degree to which it could add to the war-making potential of Soviet-dominated Asia under the assumptions: ([REDACTED])

25X6A

25X6A

7. Shipping Requirements Involved in an Economic Alignment of Japan and Soviet-dominated Asia.

A comprehensive survey of the shipping tonnage now serving the area, as to type, nationality, and the routes on which it is employed; a study of ports, shipbuilding, and ship-repair facilities; an assessment of the probable changes in shipping routes and tonnage requirements that would result [REDACTED]

25X6A

25X6A

[REDACTED] a final judgment on the role that shipping requirements, and the possibility of their being met, would play in developing the area's war-making potential.

SECRET

SECRET

25X6A 8. An Assessment of the War-making Potential of Soviet-dominated Asia [REDACTED]

An analysis of the existing and potential degree of economic integration through a consideration of the area's food position, strategic materials, manpower resources, industrial pattern, and shipping facilities; an identification of weaknesses and bottlenecks that will or may limit the potential of the area; an assessment of the economic effects of South Korea's and Taiwan's alignment with the area; finally, an estimate, quantitative, if possible, of the area's present and future ability to mobilize a war economy which would be economically independent of European USSR but able to act in support of the USSR in any conflict embracing the Far East.

SECRET

- 42 -

SECRET

AREA C


PRESENTLY NEUTRAL OR FRIENDLY AREAS

Problem: To determine the extent to which the area consisting of Japan, Southeast Asia and the Indian sub-continent, is capable now or in the foreseeable future of mobilizing and supporting a war economy independent from the US but to be used in support of the US in any conflict embracing the Far East.

1. The Strategic Materials Position

A survey of the present production, the possibilities for expansion, and the present pattern of consumption of such strategic materials as rubber, fibers, petroleum, ferrous and non-ferrous alloys; an analysis of their adequacy for the support of a mobilized economy within the area.

25X6A



3. Manpower Resources

A survey of manpower resources by numbers, age, sex, and occupation; an analysis of labor force and of numbers available and suitable for the armed services; a final analysis of the manpower resources as to numbers and skills (both managerial and technical) in relationship to the requirements of a mobilized economy.

4. The Industrial Position

25X6A

A survey of the present and potential industrial complexes of [REDACTED] India; an analysis of the extent to which these plants can be supported by the raw materials available domestically or in other parts of the area; an appraisal of the factors limiting industrial output of these countries and their possible combined effects which would result from attempts to expand industrial output of the whole area.



SECRET

5. Intra-area and Overseas Shipping

A comprehensive survey of the tonnage now serving the area as to type, nationality, and the routes on which it is employed; a study of ports, shipbuilding, and ship-repair facilities; an assessment of the probable changes in shipping routes and tonnage requirements that would result from an effort to maximize industrial output, with a final determination of what role the shipping factor would play in such an effort.

6. Assessment of the Capabilities for War Mobilization

An analysis of the existing and potential degree of economic integration through a consideration of the area's integration of strategic materials, food supply, manpower resources, shipping facilities, and industry; a study of the weaknesses and bottlenecks which will or may limit the potential of the area; an estimate (quantitative, if possible) of the present and future ability of the area to mobilize a war economy which would be economically independent of the US but used in support of the US in any conflict embracing the Far East.

SECRET

-44-

SECRET

AREA D

AREAS UNDER EXISTING AND POSSIBLE SOVIET DOMINATION

Problem: To appraise the degree to which the mobilization potential of Soviet-dominated Asia could be increased by the absorption of selected areas of Southeast Asia, under the assumption, (1) that

25X6A

NOTE: Designation of the investigations to be undertaken in this category depends upon certain conclusions expected to be derived from preliminary work on Sub-categories A, B, and C, as well as on regional political considerations.

SECRET

SECRET

V -- Special Regional Estimate

FAR EAST STRATEGIC MATERIALS INVESTIGATIONS

Problem: To estimate the dependence of the USSR and the US respectively on the Far East to meet normal and emergency requirements for strategic raw materials.

NOTE: There is illustrated below a proposed treatment of the studies in this category. The following strategic materials may be covered in individual projects:

Strategic Minerals

Tin  
Manganese  
Tungsten  
Molybdenum  
Antimony  
Graphite  
Mercury  
Zinc  
Copper  
Lead  
Nickle  
Bauxite  
Chromium  
Mica

Strategic Materials (except minerals)

Agar-agar  
Fibers  
Cocoanut and palm oil, sesame,  
rapeseed and tung oil  
Rubber  
Petroleum  
Castor oil  
Shellac

Example: The Extent of US and USSR Dependence on the Tin Resources of the Far East.

An analysis of the normal peace-time and emergency requirements of the US and the USSR for tin; an analysis of the sources of supply of tin available to the US and the USSR; estimates of tin stockpiles available to the US and the USSR at present and a schedule of probable future tin stockpiling activities of each country; alternatives to or substitutes for tin in the industrial processes of each country; an appraisal of the extent of dependence on Far Eastern sources of tin by the US and the USSR.

SECRET